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Abstract 
This project has at the very least a dual purpose. It seeks to elaborate on uptake, applying 
to it theories from sociology, linguistics, history, and philosophy, and to illustrate the process of 
uptake in Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South and demonstrate the applicability of rhetorical 
concepts to literary texts by generating a reading of that novel. In Chapter 1, “Explaining 
Selection in Theory,” I offer two principles, habitus and narrative memory, to explain selection, 
which Anne Freadman claims is the central mechanism of uptake but does not thoroughly 
account for. In Chapter 2, “Exploring Selection in Literature,” I use the events of the first two 
chapters of North and South to explore the ways that habitus and narrative memory guide 
characters’ selections. Close attention to uptake in the novel reveals the ways that Margaret’s 
powerlessness makes the subtle power dynamics of communication central to her ability to 
navigate her world.  
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Introduction 
This project, like much of my academic work, results from the combination of potentially 
disparate perspectives, which nonetheless have a great deal to say to one another. In this case, I 
am combining the concept of uptake, which comes out of rhetorical genre studies, with the 
analysis of Victorian literature. This project, then, has at the very least a dual purpose. First, it 
seeks to elaborate on uptake, applying to it theories from sociology, linguistics, history, and 
philosophy. Second, it seeks to illustrate the process of uptake in Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and 
South and demonstrate the applicability of rhetorical concepts to literary texts by generating a 
reading of that novel. In order to accomplish these purposes, I have divided this work into two 
separate chapters, the first of which engages with the theoretical underpinnings of uptake and the 
second of which applies that theory to the novel.   
In Chapter 1, “Explaining Selection in Theory,” I begin by contrasting J.L. Austin’s 
speech-act theory, out of which the term uptake arises, with Mikhail Bakhtin’s utterance-based 
model of communication. Bakhtin’s theory helps to situate Anne Freadman’s work on uptake 
within a rhetorical model of communication and provide some of the background from which 
rhetorical genre studies arises. Freadman uses uptake to explain how people are capable of 
moving meaning between genres—that is, how an utterance in one genre can cause a response in 
another—and identifies selection as the central mechanism of uptake. I argue, however, that she 
does not fully answer the “how” question because she does not explain how the mechanism of 
selection works. I offer two principles for how individuals make selections: habitus and narrative 
memory. Pierre Bourdieu’s explanation of habitus posits that through incorporation, the 
individual becomes invested with a particular orientation to and structure for the world that mark 
certain aspects out as relevant and important for meaning and social action. Individuals then 
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make selections, in a mostly unconscious way, on the basis of the habitus that orients them to the 
social world. In redefining narrative, Louis O. Mink and Linda Ethell both posit that narrative is 
a cognitive tool that allows people to understand themselves and the world. By relating 
experiences and events to one another in a recognizable sequence, narrative memory encourages 
individuals to make selections that are consistent with both the narrative of the events 
surrounding the utterance and the narrative of their own of identity. 
In Chapter 2, “Exploring Selection in Literature,” I use the events of the first two 
chapters of North and South to explore the ways that habitus and narrative memory guide 
characters’ uptakes. In these two chapters, the main character, Margaret, is being courted by a 
man whose habitus and narrative identity lead him to make selections consistently different than 
her own. Because the main difference between their habitus is a matter of sincerity, defined as 
how well a person’s display or communication matches their experience of emotion, I discuss the 
nonverbal cues that are established throughout the novel and the many potential meanings that 
nonverbal displays can have. The gap between experience and display highlights the mechanism 
of selection by creating the potential for multiple interpretations of emotional displays that may 
not align with the sources of such displays. In order to situate and understand the characters’ 
uptakes, I must also, of course, explore the social, ideological, and discursive contexts of their 
communication. I argue that the different systems of representation portrayed in the novel 
compound the problem that social conventions pose to understanding the source of display. 
Ultimately, the novel reveals a deep-seated apprehension of the mechanism of uptake by 
illustrating the problems that can be caused by the disparity between the intention behind an 
utterance and the potential uptakes of that utterance.  
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Chapter 1: Explaining Selection in Theory 
Anne Freadman’s work on uptake in rhetorical genre studies responds to and challenges 
early speech-act theory’s insistence on a direct causal relationship between a speech-act and its 
effect. Instead, Freadman argues that uptake demands attention to personal, social, discursive, 
and intertextual contexts in order to understand the process that occurs between the issuance of 
an utterance and responses to it. Ultimately, uptake is a dynamic and interstitial process that 
occurs not just between a speech act and a perlocutionary effect, but in the intersection of 
multiple configurations of social values and the people that embody them. Importantly, this 
convergence results in a tangle of potential meanings, implications, and actions that must 
somehow be assessed by both parties involved in communicating. Selection, the choosing of one 
or more aspects of this tangle as the most relevant context of the utterance, is therefore central to 
the function of uptake. Although Freadman identifies selection as central to uptake, she does not 
explore the principles by which people make selections. In what follows, I will offer two such 
principles, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and the concept of narrative memory, and argue 
that they are central to selection because they are important tools for orienting people in and 
helping them to understand the world. First, however, I will situate and explore Freadman’s 
concept of uptake in the context of an appropriately rhetorical model of communication as social 
action. 
Communication as Rhetorical and Social Action 
The concept of uptake in rhetorical genre theory has its beginnings in the speech-act 
model proposed by J.L. Austin in How to Do Things with Words. While speech-act theory serves 
as a useful springboard into the concept of uptake, it has some significant flaws that limit its 
applicability to a nuanced and robust understanding of uptake. In order to develop an 
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appropriately rhetorical model of communication for understanding uptake, we must first shift 
away from speech-act theory’s static, decontextualized models of how communication works. To 
this end, it will be helpful to replace Austin’s speech-act with Mikhail Bakhtin’s utterance—
which captures the complex interactions of the individuals involved in communication and the 
historical resonances contained in language—in order to return to an appropriately rhetorical 
model of communication.  
Austin’s speech-act model distinguishes between three types of speech acts: the 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. Austin describes the locutionary act as the 
“performance of an act of saying something” (94, 99)
1
. By contrast, the illocutionary act is the 
“performance of an act in saying something” (99). The locutionary act is an act by virtue of the 
fact that something was said. The illocutionary act is an action that can only be performed 
verbally, such as promising, arguing, or pleading. Austin’s definition of the perlocutionary act 
describes a more consequential action: “Saying something will often, or even normally, produce 
certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the 
speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of 
producing them” (101). Of course, the perlocutionary act can also be quite unintended, but the 
occurrence of the perlocutionary act depends upon the perlocutionary effect. In rhetorical genre 
studies, uptake refers to the process by which a locutionary or illocutionary act becomes a 
perlocutionary act, that is, achieves a perlocutionary effect. Austin, however, is not interested in 
the perlocutionary effects of speech acts because he is not interested in a model of 
communication that accounts for the people who are communicating. He attempts to isolate the 
speech act itself and define it as the primary unit of communication. 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, all italics are in the original. 
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Bakhtin, by contrast, develops a model of communication that is fundamentally 
constituted by the people involved in communicating. Bakhtin labels the primary unit of 
communication the utterance. Furthermore, he claims that the utterance cannot be defined by any 
grammatical structure and distinguishes between “the sentence as a unit of language, as distinct 
from the utterance as a unit of speech communication” (Bakhtin 73). In contrast to Austin’s 
attempt to define speech acts according to their grammatical structure, Bakhtin uses the 
interaction between communicators to define the boundaries of utterances in two ways. First, he 
argues that “the boundaries of each concrete utterance as a unit of speech communication are 
determined by a change of speaking subjects” (Bakhtin 71). Second, he delimits the boundaries 
of the utterance according to what he calls finalization. The finalization of the utterance is 
achieved when the speaker’s intentions and plan for the utterance are completed and when there 
is “the possibility of responding to [the utterance] or, more precisely and broadly, of assuming a 
responsive attitude toward it” (Bakhtin 76-77). Finalization, then, represents “the inner side of 
the change of speech subjects” because it creates the conditions for that change by making the 
initial utterance whole (Bakhtin 76). Neither of these conditions requires certain grammatical or 
language structures; they instead rely upon the understandings of speaker and listener.  
In Bakhtin’s model of communication, the utterance is inherently and dynamically 
interpersonal. He explains that utterances and the relationships between utterances “presuppose 
other (with respect to the speaker) participants in speech communication” (Bakhtin 72). 
Additionally, this presupposed other is not a passive listener but takes “an active, responsive 
attitude toward the utterance” (Bakhtin 68). The active orientation of the listener is an essential 
part of the communication process because it is this listener “for whose sake, in essence, [the 
utterance] is actually created” (Bakhtin 94). As a result, the speaker expects this active 
6 
 
responsive orientation in the listener and “[t]he entire utterance is constructed, as it were, in 
anticipation of encountering this response” (Bakhtin 94). Bakhtin labels this anticipation an 
utterance’s addressivity (95). The nature of an utterance’s addressivity shapes “[b]oth the 
composition and, particularly, the style of the utterance depend[ing] on those to whom the 
utterance is addressed, how the speaker (or writer) senses and imagines his addressees, and the 
force of their effect on the utterance” (Bakhtin 95). For Bakhtin, the listener is as important as 
the speaker in determining the style and form of the utterance. 
The composition and style of the utterance are also affected by the content or topic being 
discussed. Charles Schuster explains that in Bakhtin’s modified speech triangle of “speaker-hero-
listener…the three elements introduce equivalent pressures on speaking and writing” (595). 
Bakhtin replaces subject with hero to emphasize the fact that the subject of discussion is active in 
shaping the concrete utterance (Schuster 595). Schuster explains that “the hero also ‘speaks’; it 
too contains its own accumulation of values and terms. It too carries with it a set of associations, 
an ideological and stylistic profile” (Schuster 596). The social and ideological resonances of 
certain subjects, the things that have already been said about them and how those things were 
said, influence the way in which people are likely to and able to speak about them. Subjects are 
not neutral and neither are the words used to discuss them. 
Bakhtin argues that all language is always already politically and ideologically saturated 
and that speakers must work to negotiate these meanings as they construct an utterance.  Bakhtin 
claims,  
“When a member of a speaking collective comes upon a word, it is not as a 
neutral word of language…The word enters his context from another context, 
permeated with the interpretations of others. His own thought finds the word 
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already inhabited. Therefore the orientation of a word among words, the varying 
perception of another’s word and the various means for reacting to it, are perhaps 
the most fundamental problems for the metalinguistic study of any kind of 
discourse.” (qtd. in Schuster 597)  
In crafting the concrete utterance, the individual attempts to negotiate these pre-given meanings 
and associations to respond to the demands of the speech situation, including the listener, 
hero/subject, and the speaker’s own intentions.  
It is impossible, however, for the speaker to make the word entirely her own because 
“each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations” (Bakhtin 91). Each utterance bears the 
ideological traces of the previous uses of the words that compose it. In a more comprehensive 
way, however, no utterance can belong in isolation to one individual speaker.  Because 
utterances use the words of others, expound on topics already determined by others, and 
anticipate the reactions of others, “every utterance must be regarded primarily as a response” 
(Bakhtin 91). Furthermore, the utterance itself can only be fully understood by exploring its 
dialogic overtones, the semantic, expressive, and stylistic ways that it responds to and integrates 
other utterances (Bakhtin 92). As Bakhtin notes, “The utterance proves to be a very complex and 
multiplanar phenomenon if considered not in isolation and with respect to its author (the speaker) 
only, but as a link in the chain of speech communication and with respect to other, related 
utterances” (Bakhtin 93). Understanding meaning, this implies, depends not only on the 
intentions of the speaker but upon the utterance’s relationships with other utterances that 
precede, follow, and contextualize it. Meaning is dialogic, then, in the sense that it exists 
between at least two utterances and their context. 
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Genre is also constituted by the relationship between at least two utterances and by the 
context, more specifically the typified rhetorical situation, of the utterance. As Bakhtin explains, 
“Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used 
develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances” (60). The dialogism that exists 
between utterances within a genre also exists between genres themselves. Anis Bawarshi and 
Mary Jo Reiff clarify Bakhtin’s position, saying “Bakhtin also describes a more horizontal set of 
relationships between genres, in which genres engage in dialogic interaction with one another as 
one genre becomes a response to another within a sphere of communication” (83). They argue 
that “[s]uch an intertextual view of genre has been central to RGS’s [rhetorical genre studies] 
understanding of genres as complex social actions” (83). The connections between an utterance 
and its genre, and between interrelated genres are, in part, what allow individual utterances to 
participate meaningfully in social systems. As Bakhtin points out, “The very interrelations 
between primary and secondary genres and the process of the historical formation of the latter 
shed light on the nature of the utterance (and above all on the complex problem of the 
interrelations among language, ideology, and world view)” (62). Uptake moves between these 
varying levels by coordinating responses to individual utterances through the generic, social, and 
ideological contexts of those utterances. 
Selection as the Central Mechanism of Uptake 
Freadman’s model of uptake relies on this interstitial understanding of communication, 
which makes the mechanism of selection central to what communication can achieve. Freadman 
claims that meaning is created not by the speaker, but between the speaker and listener. She 
argues that traditional performative models of language incorrectly posit that speakers exchange 
meaning during communication: “To suppose that discursive interaction is the giving and 
9 
 
receiving of meanings is like describing a game of tennis as the giving and receiving of balls” 
(“Tennis” 44). Instead, meaning is analogous to the giving and receiving of shots—actions that 
have significance and perform functions because of their situation within the pre-existing rules of 
the game—and must, therefore, be created dialogically, “the meaning of each interaction to be 
the upshot of the perpetual modification of each shot by its return” (“Tennis” 45). She argues 
that rather than exchanging meaning, speakers exchange signs. Meaning is then created from 
these signs through each participant’s uptake of the other’s signs on the basis of their 
understanding of what those signs do within the given space and rules of the utterances. Such 
“[m]eaning is not content; it is place and function” (“Tennis” 59). Because communication 
attempts to achieve purposes as much as it attempts to share meanings, what an act of 
communication means relies upon what that act accomplishes between the people involved in the 
communication. 
If meaning is created between participants engaged in communication, then we must 
acknowledge that what seems important to the speaker may not be the most important aspect of 
the communication for the listener. Freadman insists that understanding of genres and uptake 
must move past Austin’s speech act theory for this very reason. Austin attempts to isolate and 
purify the speech-act by putting aside its perlocutionary effects and sequels (“Uptake” 48).  
However, “uptake depends on a step that is not specified in speech act theory…the step in which 
our uptake selects, defines, or represents its object” (“Uptake” 48). In order to understand how 
communication is achieved, we must be attentive to the multiple aspects of an utterance to which 
a listener can respond and attempt to figure out why the listener responded to the aspect they did. 
As Freadman explains, “Uptake is first the taking of an object; it is not the causation of a 
response by an intention. This is the hidden dimension of the long, ramified, intertextual memory 
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of uptake: the object is taken from a set of possibles.” (“Uptake” 48). Although Freadman here 
identifies selection as the central mechanism of uptake, she does not elaborate on how it works. 
In what follows, I offer two different principles of selection that can serve as a basis for 
understanding how individuals select relevant aspects of an utterance. 
Habitus as a Principle of Selection 
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu specifies a three-way relationship between social positions, 
dispositions (habitus), and position takings that guides individuals’ decision-making processes 
(Practical Reason 6). Social positions are individuals’ locations within the field of the social—
the complex structure of social space that is defined by geographical, temporal, cultural, and 
economic factors. Position takings refer to moments of decision-making in which the individual 
navigates that social space. Dispositions refer to the principles by which these decisions are 
made and are central to Bourdieu’s practice-based view of the social world.  
Bourdieu describes his own philosophy of the social as “a philosophy of action 
designated at times as dispositional which notes the potentialities inscribed in the body of agents 
and in the structure of the situations where they act or, more precisely, in the relations between”  
individuals and situations (Practical Reason vii). The interaction between an individual’s 
disposition and the choices possible in a particular situation guides individuals’ actions. Within 
this system,  
“subjects” are active and knowing agents endowed with a practical sense, that is, 
an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division (what is 
usually called taste), and also a system of durable cognitive structures (which are 
essentially the product of an internalization of objective structures) and of 
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schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate 
response. (Practical Reason 25)  
For Bourdieu, then, decision-making is simultaneously a conscious and unconscious process. 
Individuals make active choices, but they are also guided by acquired systems of preferences 
which may govern their decision-making processes without individuals ever being aware of their 
presence. Bourdieu calls these systems habitus: “The theory of practice as practice insists…that 
the objects of knowledge are constructed…[and] that the principle of this construction is the 
system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice and is 
always oriented toward practical functions” (Logic 52). The habitus is the residue of an 
individual’s past choices and experiences. By recording past successes and failures, both the 
individual’s own and others’, the habitus helps to direct the individual’s practical choices and 
generate future behavior that is consistent with past behavior. 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on the practical also provides an explanation for why we take the 
social world seriously. He explains what he calls “the necessity of the social world” as “the 
practical relation to the world, the pre-occupied, active presence in the world through which the 
world imposes its presence, with its urgencies, its things to be done and said, things made to be 
said, which directly govern words and deeds without ever unfolding as a spectacle” (Logic 52). 
This necessity is made possible by the transference of physical necessity onto the social through 
the construction of the habitus by repeated interactions with the social world: “the habitus is 
what enables the institution to attain full realization… through the capacity for incorporation, 
which exploits the body’s readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social” 
(Logic 57). It is through the capacity for incorporation, through the repeated experiences of the 
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body within the social, that individuals come to view the social as necessary, natural, and 
inevitable.  
It is also the capacity for incorporation which makes the individual unconscious of the 
nature and effects of the habitus because “the purely social and quasi-magical process of 
socialization…which is prolonged, strengthened, and confirmed by social treatments that tend to 
transform instituted difference into natural distinction, produces quite real effects, durably 
inscribed in the body and in belief” (Logic 58). These physical, embodied responses to the social 
direct and shape the individual’s decisions without any conscious reference to the past or past 
experiences. Bourdieu explains, “the body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief. 
It does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing 
it back to life. What is learned by the body is not something that one has, like knowledge that can 
be brandished, but something that one is” (Logic 73, emphasis added). Individuals are 
constituted by the ways in which their social experiences become incorporated and enacted in 
their interactions with the social world. This is the central tenet of Bourdieu’s notion of the 
habitus:  
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Logic 53)  
The durable inscription of individuals’ past experiences of the social creates their future social 
practices. Despite the ubiquity of the habitus, its very embodiedness makes it largely invisible, a 
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force that shapes individuals’ decisions without overtly influencing their conscious decision-
making processes.  
 The habitus thus functions as one of the fundamental principles for the selection that 
Freadman argues is central to uptake. Habitus constitutes an internalized set of norms that allows 
individuals to make sense of the social world and recognize aspects of the social world as viable 
and worthy of response. Because an individual’s previous experiences serve as the basis for their 
future experiences, the social world acquires a sense of inevitability in which social values 
become assigned on the basis of social necessities (Logic 53). The limitation of individuals’ 
choices thus functions according to the mutually reciprocal relationship between practice and 
value in which the “most improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind 
of immediate submission to order that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to 
refuse what is anyway denied and to will the inevitable” (Logic 54). This reciprocal relationship 
also creates a kind of continuity, in which an individual’s choices seem, retrospectively at least, 
to fit a pre-planned pattern of action. Such continuity can be explained, however, by “the 
necessary yet unpredictable confrontation between the habitus and an event that can exercise a 
pertinent incitement on the habitus only if the latter snatches it from the contingency of the 
accidental and constitutes it as a problem by applying to it the very principles of its solution” 
(Logic 55). This confrontation is unpredictable only in the sense that the habitus has “infinite yet 
strictly limited generative capacity,” the ability to create an infinite range of responses to an 
infinite set of events or utterances that all, nonetheless, must be generated by the values and 
possibilities of the habitus in response to situations that the habitus must be able to recognize 
(Logic 55). This complex interplay between social context, individual experiences, and 
disposition serves as the basis for selecting an object and crafting a response. 
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The habitus also serves as the basis for the consistency of group values and practices: “It 
ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of 
schemes of perception, thought, and action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and 
their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms” (Logic 54). 
Practices, or the social choices and selections individuals make from a range of possible options, 
must then be understood in part as the relationship between the social conditions which produced 
the habitus and the social conditions in which the habitus is activated or applied, and will reflect 
the extent to which the values in those two sets of conditions coincide or conflict (Logic 56). 
This understanding of how social context shapes individual identity and decision-making helps 
us to understand how social groups can develop consistent sets of values and practices that may 
nonetheless remain tacit within the group: “the objective homogenizing of group or class habitus 
that results from homogeneity of conditions of existence is what enables practices to be 
objectively harmonized without any calculation or objective reference to a norm and mutually 
adjusted in the absence of any direct interaction or…explicit co-ordination” (Logic 58-9). 
Despite the highly individualized nature of the habitus, individuals will likely make similar 
selections from and responses to an utterance on the basis of their shared experiences within such 
groups.  
Narrative Memory as a Principle of Selection 
Selection also relies upon the individual’s recognition that the utterance happening now is 
related to utterances and events in the past, upon “the long, ramified, intertextual memory of 
uptake.” As Freadman explains, “without that memory, the sequence of acts would be 
unintelligible as a sequence, it could not establish its credentials…and it could not enact its 
consequences” (“Uptake” 42). Such memory relies upon our ability to put events into sequences 
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in such a way that we can create connections between them and meaning out of the whole. 
Narrative, as a cognitive tool for putting events into a sequence that defines them in relation to 
one another, provides a productive way of thinking about this memory and the types of selection 
that it makes possible. In this section, I will argue that narrative memory is necessary to 
understand how uptake makes possible the translation of utterances between genres and sign 
systems. Then, I will suggest that narrative memory takes two different forms that both 
determine our selections: first, as shared narrative history and second, as individual narrative 
identity.   
The Problem of Semiosis 
 Uptake is dialogic not only in that it relates utterances to other utterances, but in that it 
relates disparate systems of meaning to one another. Just as genres must be understood through 
their intertextual connections to other genres, utterances must be understood through their 
intertextual connections to vastly different kinds of utterances. Because communicative 
sequences can, and often do, move from one meaning-making system to any other meaning-
making system, the potential for communicative translation becomes almost impossibly 
complex. Narrative memory helps to identify which translations are relevant in a given situation 
as we take up a given utterance. 
Freadman identifies the interplay between the abstract realm of ideas and the physical 
realm of the body as a central problem in developing a full understanding of how uptake works 
and insists that “we should not overlook the threshold that must be crossed between language 
and the body” (“Uptake” 43). She turns to the concept of translation in order to explain the 
possibility of this connection. She explains that “‘translation,’ of whatever kind, is the mediation 
of a boundary, not its obliteration. I will say that the same applies to uptake, because I want to 
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say that ‘uptake’ is the local event of crossing a boundary” (“Uptake” 43). Freadman discusses 
the mediation of these boundaries in terms of Peirce’s notion of infinite semiosis, which helps 
her to account for the ability of utterances to be taken up across boundaries. Freadman explains 
that the communicative units in which Peirce is interested are “actions associated with 
knowledges, and Peirce would count them signs…They signify in their sequence, in the ways in 
which each is articulated with other sign-events” (“Uptake” 49, emphasis added). Thus, Peirce 
brings the realm of communication out of the purely verbal or ideological and reconnects it to the 
practical: “When Peirce theorizes infinite semiosis, he is at pains to ensure that the realm of signs 
is subject to no other force but that of signs. But he is equally concerned not to allow signhood to 
remain within, or to be defined by, the realm of pure ideality. Signhood has effects in the world, 
it changes things, gets people to do things, has material consequences” (“Uptake” 49). The 
necessity of the social world and the incorporation of social values—that is, the performative 
magic of the social whereby social values are made real and pressing by their enactment in the 
body—endow the ideality of signs with practical consequences and effects. The substitution of 
the ideal for the practical, and the comparability of values across social fields, allows for this 
translation between meaning-making systems. 
Importantly, for Freadman, taking her cue from Peirce, signs are not only lingual units, 
but actions that have ideological associations: “All these things are signs—that’s what guarantees 
that they can translate into one another; but we are talking about translation, not porridge. They 
need to be translated because they are formally and materially distinct from one another” 
(“Uptake” 49). Here is uptake. Uptake, by bringing into play all of our social and ideological 
presuppositions, by tapping into our previous knowledge of how utterances translate across 
genres, by using our own physicality as incentive, allows us to move an utterance across formal 
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and material boundaries and to see the ways that the utterance ramifies across different meaning-
making systems.  
Furthermore, Freadman explains that any act of communication already participates in 
such intersystem play: “Semiotics holds that a semiotic act is constituted by signs from a variety 
of media and a variety of languages. It is this principle, the always-already of intersystem 
translation, that” constitutes uptake and makes possible an individual’s response to an act of 
communication (“Uptake” 50). Like Bakhtin’s utterances, “[a]ll signs thus refer both forwards 
and backwards to other signs” (“Uptake” 42). However, the intersystem translation of signs also 
“ensures that semiosis is infinite, that it does not close and is not confined to a particular 
domain” (“Uptake 50). Consequently, Freadman concludes that “[i]nfinite semiosis is not infinite 
in a single dimension, but can ramify in multiple ways” (“Uptake” 50). Because infinite semiosis 
is multi-directional and multi-dimensional, individuals’ proclivity for fitting events into 
narratives is particularly important. Narratives help to make sense of the tangled mess of infinite 
semiosis by making sequences recognizable as sequences, by separating out a single dimension 
of such semiosis and demarcating it as a significant series of actions tied together by meaningful 
relationships. Selection depends upon the way that we locate a particular utterance in a narrative 
sequence that relates it to other utterances.  
Memory as Collective Narrative History 
Historical theorist Louis O. Mink argues for the centrality of narrative in creating 
knowledge and constructing histories. Mink calls narrative “a primary cognitive instrument – an 
instrument rivaled, in fact, only by theory and by metaphor as irreducible ways of making the 
flux of experience comprehensible” (Mink 213). He explains: 
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On the one hand, there are all the occurrences of the world – at least all that we 
may directly experience or inferentially know about – in their concrete 
particularity. On the other is an ideally theoretical understanding of those 
occurrences that would treat each as nothing other than a replicable instance of a 
systematically interconnected set of generalizations. But between these extremes, 
narrative is the form in which we make comprehensible the many successive 
interrelationships that are comprised by a career. (Mink 214) 
Narrative offers a way to process and structure experience, creating a comprehensible package 
out of a chaos of information that can then be applied to and used to understand various 
experiences. This process orders knowledge, but it also attempts to unify it: “The cognitive 
function of narrative form, then, is not just to relate a succession of events but to body forth an 
ensemble of interrelationships of many different kinds as a single whole” (Mink 218). Mink is 
careful to clarify, however, that “‘events’ (or, more precisely, descriptions of events) are not the 
raw material out of which narratives are constructed; rather an event is an abstraction from a 
narrative” (220). We can label things discrete events, and make sense of them as events, only 
after they have been placed in relationship to other events within a narrative sequence.  
 This is equally true of utterances as events. Individuals are able to make sense of 
utterances because they can locate those utterances within a narrative sequence and relate them 
to other utterances within that sequence. Bakhtin locates each utterance in what he calls chains of 
speech communion: “Each individual utterance is a link in the chain of speech communion. It 
has clear-cut boundaries that are determined by the change of speech subjects (speakers), but 
within these boundaries the utterance…reflects the speech process, others’ utterances, and, above 
all, preceding links in the chain (sometimes close and sometimes—in areas of cultural 
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communication—very distant)” (Bakhtin 93). Utterances are always responsive; they respond to 
other related utterances in terms both of what has already been said and how it was said. As 
Bakhtin points out, it is impossible for an utterance to be original in the sense that it addresses an 
entirely new topic in an entirely new way: “The object of speech, regardless of what this topic 
may be, does not become the object of speech for the first time in any given utterance; a given 
speaker is not the first to speak about it. The object, as it were, has already been articulated, 
disputed, elucidated, and evaluated in various ways. Various viewpoints, world views, and trends 
cross, converge, and diverge in it” (Bakhtin 93). The utterance is always crafted out of what has 
gone before, out of established social and political beliefs, pre-existing speech genres, and 
previous stances on a topic. Our sense of narrative memory enables us to recognize the 
precedents of the individual utterance and to decide upon the way in which those precedents are 
meaningful to the utterance at hand. Speakers then select the aspect(s) of the utterance that seem 
consistent with this narrative history, which enables them to respond in ways that continue the 
narrative in which they locate the utterance. 
As noted above, however, the utterance is not only responsive but also addressive, and 
this addressivity is equally important in situating the utterance within the chain of speech 
communion. Bakhtin explains that “the utterance is related not only to preceding, but also to 
subsequent links in the chain of speech communion. When a speaker is creating an utterance, of 
course, these links do not exist. But from the very beginning, the utterance is constructed while 
taking into account possible responsive reactions, for whose sake, in essence, it is actually 
created” (Bakhtin 94). An utterance both responds to previous utterances and, being in its nature 
addressive, anticipates other utterances. When speakers craft utterances, they do so with a sense 
of narrative continuity in mind. It is important, then, that history is collective narrative memory 
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because that narrative helps speakers to predict what will come next and informs their 
expectations of probable responses. 
Memory as Individual Narrative Identity 
Narratives, because they pick and choose and reconstruct, can never be neutral. They 
point attention to certain things and away from others and embed ideologies that tell listeners 
how to interpret the information being presented; “[p]articular narratives express their own 
conceptual presuppositions” (Mink 214). While Mink, for obvious reasons, is interested in these 
questions primarily as they relate to culturally derived narratives of history, narrative is also used 
on much smaller scales as a way for individuals to make sense of their place in the world. These 
presuppositions are not just, then, cultural ideologies broadly speaking that help to construct 
narratives of country formation and political evolution. They are also localized presuppositions 
that help individuals navigate social space. 
Philosopher Linda Ethell argues that narrative creates the illusion of stable and unified 
personal identity: “That we represent ourselves to ourselves, and others, in interpretations of 
those events that we take to comprise our histories (selection is the fundamental mode of 
interpretation) seems incontrovertible—it is the source of our identity as self-interpreting beings” 
(94). These narrative identities allow individuals to make sense of both themselves and others, 
and it is through the construction of such narrative identities that individuals make sense of their 
lives and choices. As Ethell points out, however, this making sense is a continuous process that 
does not always guarantee a good fit between an individual’s actions and the narrative she uses 
to interpret them: “We may be mistaken or self-deceived in our idea of who we are, or we may 
meet with experiences that, if we do not simply deny them, demand revision of our existing self-
representation” (95). In this sense, narrative memory shapes selection by encouraging the 
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individual to select an object and craft a response that is in keeping with her sense of her own 
identity in narrative. That is, the individual is likely to respond in a way that is narratively 
consistent with her previous selections and responses in order to maintain a stable sense of her 
own identity, although this process of selection can also lead to disparate uptakes that generate 
revision of that narrative identity.  
Any sense of narrative consistency, however, depends upon social and cultural 
definitions of narrative continuity. Philosopher Paul Ricouer argues that “an examined life is, in 
large part, one purged, one clarified by the cathartic effects of narratives, be they historical or 
fictional, conveyed by our culture” (qtd. in Ethell 95). To rephrase, an examined life is one in 
which an individual has been able to fit the experiences she has had and the decisions she has 
made into culturally sanctioned narratives. Such individuals can feel good about their choices, 
and therefore their identity, because those choices have been fit within the parameters of 
culturally accepted and recognized narratives of personal development that align with particular 
identities. Identity thus is a nexus of cultural categories defined by stock narrative patterns and of 
individual choices that are either made in order to conform to those narrative patterns or 
retroactively placed within them.  
 Bourdieu, of course, argues that identity also consists of deeply incorporated physical and 
social experiences. I would posit, however, that in order for habitus to actually constitute 
identity, it must be placed into a narrative that uses social values to interpret it as a recognizable 
personal and social identity. This move, though not explicitly present in Bourdieu, is not 
contradictory to his theories of the relationship between habitus and field. Rather, it is an 
extension of his argument that the social is only made real through incorporation in the body and 
that the body becomes value-laden only through its position within the field of social values. 
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Thus, there is a reciprocal relationship in which the habitus—incorporated, learned social 
experience, which is both structured and structuring—helps us to internalize social narratives 
because embodied knowledge is something that we are, not something that we have. Those 
narratives then help  us to make sense of the habitus, even as they reinscribe it by encouraging 
choices that are consistent with the narrative and therefore also with the habitus. The 
combination of narrative memory and habitus allows us to account for the role that identity plays 
in uptake without having to rely on a dichotomy between society and identity or on an 
essentialized view of a unitary self. 
 Bourdieu himself seems to suggest that habitus has a narrative component, albeit one that 
is physical or practical, rather than ideological. He argues that the embodied knowledge of the 
habitus recognizes possible futures, or narrative continuations of the present, embedded in the 
action and structure of the present: “But these responses [to the present moment] are first 
defined, without any calculation, in relation to objective potentialities, immediately inscribed in 
the present, things to do or not to do, things to say or not to say, in relation to a probable 
‘upcoming’ future…[which] puts itself forward with an urgency and a claim to existence that 
excludes all deliberation” (Logic 53). A coming moment, then, is quasi-present because it “is 
inscribed in the very physiognomy of the present” as individuals determine their actions in the 
present in anticipation of the quasi-present coming moment (Practical Reason 82). This is not a 
conscious process, but instead a dispositional response: “one can, for example, be adjusted to the 
necessities of a game…without ever needing to give oneself such an objective” (Practical 
Reason 82). This is the mechanism of uptake. There are a number of possible futures inscribed in 
the structure of the present, but habitus and narrative necessity select the possible future that 
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makes the most sense within the field and for the individual, designating it as the natural 
continuation of the social narratives converging in the event.  
Consequently, narratives and habitus support one another: “The habitus, a product of 
history, produces individual and collective practices – more history – in accordance with the 
schemes generated by history” (Logic 54). This reciprocal relationship is what creates a sense of 
narrative continuity or consistency, recognizable patterns that individuals can unconsciously 
replicate.  Bourdieu explains: “Because native membership in a field implies a feel for the game 
in the sense of a capacity for practical anticipation of the ‘upcoming’ future contained in the 
present, everything that takes place in it seems sensible: full of sense and objectively directed in 
a judicious direction” (Logic 66). Choices become common sense to individuals when they fit 
within the logic of existing social narratives and coincide with individuals’ previous patterns of 
behavior, the habitus-based narrative of their personal identities. These choices thus fall within a 
defined range and can be constructed into a cohesive narrative, despite the fact that individuals 
do not often consciously make decisions with the intent to create such a narrative. As Bourdieu 
suggests, the appearance of narrative continuity in a person’s life is created by the application of 
the habitus to solve problems generated by the habitus (Logic 55). The conditions for 
recognizing an object and the criteria for choosing a response are generated by the same 
principles and thus help to construct consistent narratives for personal identity. 
Once we look at narrative not just as a literary or fictional form, but as a strategy for 
structuring and a mechanism for understanding the world, we can begin to understand the ways 
in which narrative memory facilitates uptake. Narratives do not have to have particular forms; 
they do not have to be linear. As structured sequences of events that both generate and allow the 
naming of relationships between events, they merely have to create discrete events and place 
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them in recognizable relationship to one another.  As such, narrative memory influences 
selection in two ways. Narratives help individuals to locate utterances in chains of other 
utterances and to make selections based on how the particular utterance relates to the other 
utterances in the chain. Narratives also encourage individuals to make selections that are 
consistent with their sense of their own identities in narrative.  
Conclusion 
Establishing habitus and narrative memory as principles of uptake allow us to better 
understand the process of uptake as it occurs on a largely unconscious basis. This perspective 
accounts for the way that social values are replicated in individual actions. It offers a way of 
understanding identity, and identity’s effects on communication, in a way that does not rely on 
essentialist views of an inherent and unified self. It also enables us to describe an individual’s 
orientation to the world in a way that both allows for individuality and maintains the social 
context of individual identity development. Importantly, it also maintains the centrality of the 
body in developing this orientation and in making the social meaningful, moving deliberately 
away from analyses of communication that are uninterested in the physical and embodied 
contexts of communication. As such, uptake describes, with a good deal of accuracy, what 
actually happens during communication. 
There is a tension, however, between the unconscious process of uptake and social and 
individual resistance to consciously considering uptake. Uptake, due to its roots in speech-act 
theory and rhetorical genre studies, has inherited a view of communication in which the action 
achieved by communication supersedes both truth value and form. Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and 
South illustrates the mechanism of uptake beautifully, exploring the differences between social 
value systems that result in varied selections and uptakes, but it nonetheless questions models of 
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communication that give primacy to functionality. Instead, the novel establishes a both-and view 
of communication, in which communication both has truth value and is practical and situational, 
and in which meaning is both content and place and function. The novel enacts its social 
moment’s dispute over the nature of value, between the rising industrial emphasis on value as 
functional (i.e. things are valuable because they allow or achieve other things) or the more 
traditional emphasis on value as inherent (i.e. things are valuable because they have beneficial 
moral qualities). Ultimately, the novel privileges the second even as it recognizes the first. 
Although Gaskell acknowledges the social functions of communication, she seems to view them 
mostly as obstacles to be overcome in order to communicate on a higher level of moral truth. I 
think it is important to acknowledge and understand this resistance. Uptake is, undoubtedly, an 
excellent scholarly explanation of how communication works. We must be aware, however, that 
many people are and will remain skeptical of the ability for communication, and through it 
community, to be meaningful if communication is pragmatic rather than content-driven.  
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Chapter 2: Exploring Selection in Literature 
 North and South concerns itself intimately with the relationship between emotion, 
expression, and social expectations that underlies its quest to demarcate an authentic self separate 
from the socially-created self, a dichotomy that is ultimately complicated though not, perhaps, 
intentionally. Gaskell’s novel, even as it enacts uptake, views rhetorical models of 
communication with suspicion. Gaskell frames the central problem of communication as one of 
sincerity—that is, of saying exactly what one is experiencing, thinking, or feeling in order to 
ensure a correspondence between internal states and external display. The text repeatedly enacts 
the problems of attempting sincere expression in a social world that assumes that words and 
actions are calculated to achieve certain uptakes. Gaskell also explores the problems inherent in 
knowing how to take up others’ words and actions when there is the possibility that those words 
and actions were crafted expressly to create a certain uptake rather than being an honest or 
truthful expression of the other’s thoughts or feelings. Gaskell acknowledges the rhetorical 
nature of communication, but expresses anxiety about the potential for manipulation that 
rhetorical models make possible. Sincere expression, Gaskell seems to suggest, is necessary in 
order for society to engage in the kind of meaningful dialogue that can generate innovative 
solutions to social problems and that can create meaningful relationships between individuals. 
Also necessary is the ability to suspend (or perhaps to see through) socially-learned uptakes and 
to participate in different systems of social values that open new perspectives and new ways of 
seeing social realities. Paradoxically, the text seems to simultaneously endorse a form of social 
relativism and place a strict emphasis on authenticity and sincerity that vilifies any behavior that 
shows itself to be attuned to social uptakes.  
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The primary incompatibility between Henry Lennox and Margaret Hale revolves around 
the differences in their habitus and narrative identities that lead to their different perspectives on 
uptake. Henry, the man of society, relies almost exclusively on socially-coded meanings and the 
social value placed on material things and physical attributes. Thus, he selects for the aspects of 
the utterance that conform to social convention, without attempting to account for the identity 
and experiences of the speaker. Margaret, though mostly aware of these social meanings, is 
contemptuous of them and dismisses them as interfering with any kind of genuine interaction 
with the world. Instead, she selects the aspects of the utterance that seem to correspond with her 
knowledge of the speaker’s identity, experiences, and intentions. Because of this fundamentally 
different method of selection, their relationship is fraught with disparate uptakes. Placed at the 
beginning of the book, their relationship establishes the problem of uptake as the central concern 
of the novel. As such, it constitutes an excellent opening into Gaskell’s assessment of the 
question of uptake and its proper role in communication. I will use a close examination of their 
interactions in chapters 1 and 3 to explore Gaskell’s complex stance on the interrelationships 
between experience, emotion, the body, expression, interpretation, and society. In so doing, I will 
show how the tensions surrounding uptake that are introduced by Margaret and Henry’s 
unsuccessful relationship are then elaborated on and connected to other parts of the novel.  
Experience & Display 
By distinguishing between the physical enjoyment of the shawls and the enjoyment of 
their social status, the scene in which Margaret displays the India shawls to Mrs. Shaw’s guests 
explores the problematic connection between experience and display, when display can be taken 
up in socially-coded ways that have little to do with the original experience that prompted it. 
Although I acknowledge that experience and display are mutually constitutive, not separate and 
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opposed, I am using the term experience to refer to the thoughts and feelings that comprise 
characters’ internal lives and states. By contrast, I am using the term display to refer to any 
externalization of that experience, including nonverbal cues as well as utterances. Throughout 
the novel, emotion, pleasure, and the body become sites of contest where the tension between 
individual experience and social identity is enacted. Margaret’s navigation of the tension 
between her own physical and emotional experiences and her display of them is central to the 
novel’s commentary on the fraught nature of uptake. 
The India shawl scene, like many others in the novel, is richly textured with sensual 
details that foreground the nature of physical sensation and experience:  
So Margaret went down laden with shawls, and snuffing up their spicy Eastern 
smell… Occasionally, as she was turned round, she caught a glimpse of herself in 
the mirror over the chimney-piece, and smiled at her own appearance there—the 
familiar features in the usual garb of a princess. She touched the shawls gently as 
they hung around her, and took a pleasure in their soft feel and their brilliant 
colours, and rather liked to be dressed in such splendour—enjoying it much as a 
child would do, with a quiet pleased smile on her lips. (11)  
In part, Margaret’s delight stems from the potentially absurd juxtaposition of her own social 
standing with the social standing denoted by the shawls, “the usual garb of a princess.” Largely, 
however, her enjoyment stems from the physical experience of them, the spicy smell, the soft 
feel, and the brilliant colours. Margaret’s embodiment, her thorough enjoyment of the sensations 
and activities that her body makes possible, set her apart from her companions even at this early 
moment of the book. The description of her walks at Helstone emphasizes her physicality, 
“Margaret used to tramp along by her father’s side, crushing down the fern with a cruel glee, as 
29 
 
she felt it yield under her light foot and send up the fragrance particular to it” (18). The use of 
verbs in this description also suggest how far Margaret’s experience differs from the proper 
social identity available to young women who, it would seem, would never tramp or crush, 
would never cause others to yield with cruel glee.  
The potential problems established by Margaret’s unruly physicality are quickly mediated 
by the social identity that she has internalized and mapped out into a narrative identity for 
herself. Immediately after the above description, the narrator notes that Margaret’s “keen 
enjoyment of every sensuous pleasure, was balanced finely, if not overbalanced, by her 
conscious pride in being able to do without them all, if need be” (19). Margaret’s natural 
enjoyment of sensory experience and physical pleasure is contradicted by the narrative that she 
constructs for her own identity of the virtuous, self-sacrificing woman who does not need 
material possessions—or physical or sexual pleasure—to live a fulfilling moral life. Throughout 
the novel, Margaret revels in her ability to sacrifice her own comfort and to place other people’s 
interests and feelings above her own. The novel leaves open, however, the extent to which this 
self-sacrifice is chosen and the extent to which it is, in Bourdieu’s words, “a kind of immediate 
submission to order that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is 
anyway denied and to will the inevitable” (Logic 54). Margaret’s experiences, whether 
pleasurable or not, almost always come last in any of the social hierarchies she participates in. 
The value she places on her own self-sacrifice may serve to contain her physicality, but it may 
also serve as a way of creating a positive narrative of identity out of potentially hostile or 
oppressive social conditions. Regardless, Margaret’s conflictingly physical and repressive 
habitus and self-sacrificing narrative identity guide the majority of her decisions throughout the 
novel.  
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 The novel’s interest in controlling the relationship between experience and display 
extends beyond Margaret’s attempts to regulate her own experiences. Throughout the text, 
pleasure and emotion are described as either childish—as in the passage above’s “much as a 
child would do”—or inappropriate. Moments of pleasure that are described as childlike contain 
pleasure for its own sake, an experience that is relatively unmediated by social expectations. 
Moments of pleasure that are described as inappropriate contain the display of emotion or 
pleasure for social gain. Mrs. Thornton, particularly, holds that the business of young women is 
to ensnare wealthy husbands (72) and takes up almost all of Margaret’s displays of emotion 
either as attempts to engage John Thornton’s affections or as commentaries upon his worth and 
eligibility as a husband. In this way, the inappropriate display of emotion also becomes 
inextricably linked to sexuality, sexual knowledge, and, perhaps most dangerously, a kind of 
sexual agency masquerading as passivity.  
Gaskell’s main distinction between childlike and inappropriate or sexual emotion seems 
to lie in the difference between expressing emotion because one feels it and expressing it because 
it will be taken up in a certain, socially-advantageous, way. Inappropriate display betokens a 
conscious manipulation of the way that social values influence the uptake of particular emotions, 
while childlike display is constituted by a lack of awareness about social uptake, sometimes to 
the extent of a lack of self-preservation. In short, the childlike display of emotion has expression 
as its end while the inappropriate display of emotion uses expression as a means to some other 
end. The text mediates the relationship between experience and display by distinguishing 
between these two different causes for it.  
Henry’s intrusion on the India shawl scene emphasizes the power of social uptakes to 
define the nature and causes of display: 
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Just then the door opened, and Mr. Henry Lennox was suddenly announced. Some 
of the ladies started back, as if half-ashamed of their feminine interest in dress. 
Mrs. Shaw held out her hand to the new-comer; Margaret stood perfectly still, 
thinking she might be yet wanted as a sort of block for the shawls; but looking at 
Mr. Lennox with a bright, amused face, as if sure of his sympathy in her sense of 
the ludicrousness at being thus surprised. (11) 
Henry’s intrusion into the utterly feminine world of the shawls sparks a variety of reactions—
themselves uptakes of his potential uptake of the women’s behavior—that reveal the many 
possible interpretations of their occupation, interpretations the text itself comments upon. In one 
interpretation, their behavior is a uniquely female pursuit, something frivolous and wasteful but 
unavoidable as a constitutive part of their gender. Henry makes this uptake apparent in his 
conversation with Margaret, remarking that “[p]laying with shawls is very different work to 
drawing up settlements” (12). Despite the social restrictions that enforce women’s interest in 
dress and their exclusion from the “real true law business” (12), Henry’s uptake of their 
occupation is scornful. The shawls also have particular class associations that influence how the 
women’s interactions with them can be taken up. Just as one of the women laments that she 
could not afford an India shawl for her daughter, Henry responds to Margaret’s comments that 
India shawls are perfect things with “I have no doubt they are. Their prices are very perfect too” 
(12). Because of their high prices, the shawls are objects that have and convey a particular social 
value in terms of economic wealth and class status. In this uptake, the women’s enjoyment of the 
shawls is an enjoyment of the status that they symbolize. Of course, all of these uptakes can, and 
probably do, run simultaneously as well. Despite its emphasis on Margaret’s enjoyment of the 
physical sensations of the shawls, the scene leaves open her enjoyment of them as social symbols 
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and her sense that the women’s collective enjoyment of the shawls is something ludicrous or 
frivolous. At the very least, Margaret’s display of her physical pleasure is open to any of these 
uptakes and the social judgment that accompanies them. 
Because emotions and pleasures are socially coded in this way, it becomes dangerous to 
express them because they can be taken to signify something else. In Margaret’s interactions 
with Henry, as we will continue to see, she often simply emotes while he takes her expressions 
as indicative of their socially coded meanings. Because uptake is bidirectional—that is, it 
changes the nature of the original utterance—Henry’s uptakes change the nature of Margaret’s 
expressions, making them into communicative acts that she did not intend. The most problematic 
aspect of the relationship between experience and display lies in this bidirectionality. Because 
emotion has a symbolic social meaning, the uptake of emotional display is integral in 
determining its meaning, even if that uptake is at variance with what the speaker perceives to be 
her own experiences, motives, or intentions. Of course, it is deceptive to separate entirely the 
social meaning from the experience of emotion because emotional response is in part determined 
by social context and socially-learned responses. Nevertheless, the physical experience of 
emotion that the novel repeatedly explores is a very different sort of thing than the 
contextualized social meaning of emotion (for a more thorough explanation of the novel’s 
physiology of emotion, see Matus). Margaret repeatedly struggles with conveying her powerful 
emotional experiences sincerely without running afoul of the potential social uptakes that those 
emotions may generate.  
Display & Sincerity 
 The conversation Margaret has with Henry following the scene of the India shawls 
extends the problem of display into a problem of sincerity by highlighting the gap between 
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expression and reality when selection separates the speaker’s intentions from the uptake of an 
utterance. In part, sincerity is a way of assessing the relationship between experience and 
display, and Margaret almost always defaults toward the belief that her own and other people’s 
utterances are sincere displays of their emotional experiences, and she attempts to take up their 
meaning as such. Henry, by contrast, is uninterested in the kind of intimacy that would allow him 
to understand the intentions behind utterances and instead relies on the combination of 
appearance and social meaning to take up others’ utterances. By illustrating the different 
selections that Henry and Margaret make, Gaskell interrogates the relationship between sincerity, 
habitus, and uptake. 
 The difference in Margaret and Henry’s habitual uptakes also leads to differences in the 
sincerity of their displays. Margaret, who seems to assume that other people will take up her 
displays in the same way she takes up theirs, allows her emotions to dictate her displays: “it was 
almost a surprise to see him; and now she was sure of a pleasant evening. He liked and disliked 
pretty nearly the same things that she did. Margaret's face was lightened up into an honest, open 
brightness...She received him with a smile which had not a tinge of shyness or self-
consciousness in it” (12). Much like the adjective childlike is attached to innocent displays of 
emotion throughout the novel, the adjective conscious is often used synonymously with sexual 
awareness and/or interest, as it is here. This later becomes very apparent in Margaret’s 
interactions with Thornton after his proposal. When Thornton comes to bring her mother fruit, 
Margaret tries to interact with him civilly and disinterestedly but instead ends up “sitting in 
burning silence, vexed and ashamed of her difficulty in keeping her right place, and her calm 
unconscious of heart, when Mr. Thornton was by” (219). In this example, it is not only display 
but also the experience of sexual awareness that is inappropriate. Inappropriate or sexual displays 
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of emotion are conscious displays, then, both in the sense that the individual is aware of and 
willing to manipulate the social uptakes that their behavior can produce and in the sense that the 
individual is aware of herself or others sexually. Here, the fact that Margaret is enthusiastic in 
welcoming Henry but not self-conscious about her display indicates that she is sincere in 
expressing her happiness to see him because she is unaware of any sexual attraction or interest 
between them.  
 Of course, her ignorance is also shown to be partially willful, a consistent repression of 
any emotional experience that is unpleasant, unwanted, or ill-timed that recurs throughout the 
novel. Margaret is quick to avoid anything on Henry’s part that suggests sexual interest: 
“Margaret did not quite like this speech; she winced away from it more, from remembering 
former occasions on which [Henry] had tried to lead her into a discussion (in which he took the 
complimentary part) about her own character and ways of going on. She cut his speech rather 
short” (13). Because his utterances make her uncomfortable emotionally, she preempts them, an 
uptake that precludes the more uncomfortable and irreversible uptake that could result if he 
continues. Throughout the text, Margaret shows herself to be particularly adept at repressing and 
avoiding evidence of emotions, both her own and others’, that she does not want to experience or 
engage with. This repression creates one of the central tensions in the novel’s endorsement of 
sincerity. The text simultaneously lauds complete and utter sincerity and honesty, and suggests 
that Margaret’s repressions are a moral and practical necessity. 
The contrast between Margaret and Henry in their discussion of wedding rituals also 
links sincerity to habitus. Margaret is weary and wants a genuine answer, “a few pleasant, quiet 
ideas connected with a marriage” (12). Henry thinks that she is hinting at her interest in him as a 
husband, which leads him to the compliments that she so quickly suppresses. In his response, 
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Henry emphasizes the necessity of observing social convention, “not so much to satisfy oneself, 
as to stop the world’s mouth, without which stoppage there would be very little satisfaction in 
life” (12-13). Because he is himself so accustomed to behaving in a certain way because it 
maintains proper social appearances, he consistently focuses on the socially conventional aspects 
of others’ utterances.  Margaret does not care so much about the “forms and ceremonies” (12) 
which, her conversation seems to suggest, are unattached to the real purpose and joys of a 
marriage and, by extension, a fulfilling life. Because she attempts to behave in ways consistent 
with her feelings and moral beliefs, she focuses on the aspects of others’ utterances that suggest 
their own emotions and values. While Henry’s habitus leads him to select appearance in crafting 
an uptake, Margaret’s habitus leads her to select meaning. 
Their discussion of Helstone emphasizes Margaret’s sincerity in the face of Henry’s 
uptake of her words as an idealization or metaphor intended to create symbolic social meaning: 
“There is the church and a few houses near it on the green—cottages, 
rather—with roses growing all over them.” 
“And flowering all the year round, especially at Christmas—make your 
picture complete,” said he. 
“No,” replied Margaret, somewhat annoyed, “I am not making a picture. I am 
trying to describe Helstone as it really is. You should not have said that.” 
“I am penitent,” he answered. “Only it really sounded like a village in a tale 
rather than in real life.” 
“And so it is,” replied Margaret, eagerly. “All the other places in England 
that I have seen seem so hard and prosaic-looking, after the New Forest. Helstone 
is like a village in a poem—in one of Tennyson's poems.” (13) 
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This exchange establishes three different selections of Helstone that lead to three very different 
uptakes. Helstone can be a village, a picture, or a tale; that is, it can be taken up as a reality, a 
sign, or a setting. Henry takes up Helstone as a picture, a sign of the Hale’s status as a good 
family with ties to the landed gentry.  
Margaret’s views of Helstone are more complicated.  Despite her enthusiastic depiction 
of Helstone as a setting in a tale, she also wants to claim that she is describing the reality of the 
village: “But I won't try and describe it any more. You would only laugh at me if I told you what 
I think of it—what it really is” (13). Margaret’s speech distinguishes between reality and 
socially-mediated views of reality. Even after viewing Helstone, Henry Lennox’s view of it 
remains socially mediated. Paul Kanwit argues that Henry’s descriptions of Helstone while he is 
there treat it as a landscape painting, static and “fixed,” and that Margaret is quick to remind him 
that life at Helstone is changeable and contains disappointments (206). However, despite her 
belief that she can access an unmediated reality, Margaret’s view of Helstone is clearly 
influenced by the social idealization of the idyllic English countryside and the purity of country 
life. As Rosemarie Bodenheimer explains, “Once [Margaret] has been educated by the forthright 
class antagonisms of the north, the social realities of the south emerge from behind the 
picturesque sketches” (56). Margaret’s view of reality changes when her social setting changes 
and when her values change accordingly.  
 By claiming unmediated access to reality, however, Margaret elides her own uptake. The 
interaction of her habitus and narrative identity effectively erase her selections as selections. Her 
emphasis on purity and sincerity in her own identity, her disavowal of social forms and 
ceremonies, lead her to ignore the ways in which her own views are also informed by social 
norms and values. One of the main tensions of the novel, then, is its endorsement of Margaret’s 
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purity—its view of her as a neutral arbiter of meaning—even as it shows the ways in which her 
views change as her social setting and experiences change. The novel scrutinizes the change in 
Margaret’s uptakes that is produced by the changing social values which challenge both her 
habitus and identity, even as it lauds her as having a kind of transcendent access to reality 
through her moral purity.   
The difficulty of escaping symbolic social meanings emerges further in Margaret’s final 
refusal to tell Henry about her home: “But indeed I cannot tell you about my own home. I don't 
quite think it is a thing to be talked about, unless you knew it” (14). Margaret relies here on an 
epistemology that gives primacy to experience and suggests that communication is insufficient to 
acquaint someone with the reality of a situation if they have no basis in shared experience. Her 
discomfort emphasizes the mediating role of habitus in uptake and the effect that the clash of 
different habitus can have when intention and selection are oriented differently. Henry’s 
response to this statement reinforces her concern by failing to recognize the epistemological 
problem that Margaret identifies. Instead, he takes up her statement not as a genuine expression 
of her feelings and beliefs, but as a punishment to him for disagreeing with her and as an 
opportunity for further flirtation: “because I made an unlucky remark, you will neither tell me 
what Helstone is like, nor will you say anything about your home” (14). While his statement is 
not false, it is also not entirely true. His unlucky remark has made Margaret refuse to tell him 
about Helstone, but only because it has highlighted the insufficiency of words to convey 
reality—and, perhaps, his unwillingness to take her seriously. Making himself the center of the 
conversation, he takes Margaret’s remarks not as her honest assessment of the potential for 
communication but as a strategy for negotiating the power dynamic of their relationship.  
38 
 
Henry makes a similar uptake in the proposal scene when Margaret resists his advances: 
“I have been too abrupt. I am punished” (28). The passive construction of his sentence keeps the 
focus on his experience and eliminates Margaret as an actor. Furthermore, his assumption that 
Margaret is responding merely to the form of his speech (its abruptness) and not to the content of 
it (their prospective relationship) and punishing him for failing to act in the proper form erases 
her refusal. Rather than being a rejection of him or a statement of their incompatibility, 
Margaret’s refusal is made into a rejection of the form of communication he uses and not of 
Henry himself. This uptake is understandable as a method of protecting himself from emotional 
pain, but it also reveals the habitual selection of appearance that both makes him completely 
incompatible with Margaret and leads him to make her into an aesthetic and sexual object. 
Margaret’s displays are sincere in so far as they are prompted by her thoughts and feelings and 
relatively unconcerned with social forms. Henry, unconcerned with other people’s feelings and 
obsessed with social conventions, is incapable of taking up her displays as sincere. Instead, he 
consistently takes up her displays as responses to or anticipations of social forms.  
Sincerity & Representation 
 Henry’s visit to the parsonage in chapter three is in many ways a metacommentary on the 
problems of superficiality in uptake and the tension between appearance and signification, 
between a sign and reality. Henry’s preoccupation with aesthetics and social conventions 
influences the ways that he takes up Helstone, the parsonage, Margaret, and her family. This 
section of the novel both emphasizes Henry’s appearance-driven approach to communication and 
raises the question of how systems of representation are implicated in the selection and uptake of 
utterances. By looking explicitly at the uptakes available within different systems of 
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representation, Gaskell explores the possibilities for making sincere expressions, and being taken 
up as sincere, within prescribed systems of meaning-making.  
 Household taste, most importantly décor and its relationship to nature, was an important 
sign system to the mid-Victorians (Kanwit 195). Henry’s response to the household décor of the 
parsonage opens the third chapter and establishes the disconnect that systems of representation 
can create between sincere intentions and appearance-driven uptakes:  
The little drawing-room was looking its best in the streaming light of the morning 
sun. The middle window in the bow was opened, and clustering roses and the 
scarlet honeysuckle came peeping round the corner; the small lawn was gorgeous 
with verbenas and geraniums of all bright colours. But the very brightness outside 
made the colours within seem poor and faded. The carpet was far from new; the 
chintz had been often washed; the whole apartment was smaller and shabbier than 
he had expected, as back-ground and frame-work for Margaret, herself so 
queenly. (23) 
Henry cannot appreciate the beauty, and potential moral edification, afforded by the natural 
scene, but instead focuses on the internal furnishings that indicate a lack of economic wealth. As 
John Kanwit points out, “Though Margaret had earlier acknowledged her home’s modest 
furnishings to Henry, he nevertheless expects more from a woman with a ‘good family’ (23). 
Henry believes that he can provide a better ‘frame’ (23) for a woman whom he envisions as an 
aesthetic object” (203). Henry’s equation of social standing and material possessions lead him to 
form expectations for the parsonage that are consistent with his aesthetic views of Margaret, her 
beauty, and her family and not with Margaret’s own communications about her home.  
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This moment reinforces Margaret’s earlier point that she could not convincingly describe 
Helstone to him. Though it seems that Margaret means she could not describe her home to 
anyone, the problem of mediation seems especially prominent in the case of explaining it to 
Henry because of the conflict between their habitual modes of expression and selection. For 
Henry, the social and symbolic meanings of a country parsonage possessed by a good family are 
far more important than Margaret’s attempts to convey the reality of such a place. Kanwit argues 
that “Henry, a member of an ascending profession, obsesses about overt displays of wealth and 
raising his class stature—attributes that would have led many contemporaries to call him 
‘vulgar’” (203). It is not until Henry sees the evidence of status in their household décor that he 
grasps part of what Margaret had been trying to communicate to him through language all along. 
Preoccupied with signs of class status, Henry is still unable to recognize the true value of 
Helstone for Margaret and her father. He reads only the appearances of the decor and is unable to 
connect it to what it reveals about the character of the house’s inhabitants. 
The second system of representation the chapter explores is language, and the disconnect 
between sign and signification in language is further emphasized in Henry’s appraisal of the 
evidence of Margaret’s occupations at the parsonage. Although earlier he had been very 
interested in how she would pass her time—assuming that she would either be gardening or 
attending “[a]rchery parties—pic-nics—race-balls—hunt-balls” (14)—and had refused to believe 
her when she denied her father’s ability to afford such social entertainment, he is not invested in 
trying to understanding her pursuits when he comes across evidence of them. While he waits for 
Margaret to come back with her mother, “He took up one of the books lying on the table; it was 
the Paradiso of Dante, in the proper old Italian binding of white vellum and gold; by it lay a 
dictionary, and some words copied out in Margaret's hand-writing. They were a dull list of 
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words, but somehow he liked looking at them. He put them down with a sigh” (23). The list of 
words is evidence of Margaret’s intelligence, her desire and ability to read and comprehend texts 
that are foreign to her, and her ability to move beyond surface appearances into the meaning 
beneath. To Henry, they are only appreciable as an extension of Margaret’s aesthetic—pretty to 
look at because they are written in her handwriting, but otherwise entirely uninteresting. They 
hold no interest for him because they do not provide any evidence that the Hales have economic 
or social capital. Of course, Gaskell’s use of a list of words to emphasize the disparity between 
appearance and meaning highlights the tension surrounding language in the novel. Just as Henry 
and Margaret diverge over the proper value and interpretation of the list of words, they diverge 
over the function of language as a communicative medium. Attuned primarily to the social 
conventions on the surface of language, Henry is incapable of interrogating how different values 
and perspectives can alter the way that language is used. By contrast, “Margaret’s openness to 
learning language new to her and her willingness to learn additional ways of interpreting signs” 
(Elliott 151) leads her to view language as a medium that requires sincerity on the part of the 
speaker and attention to intention on the part of the listener. 
Henry’s visit to the parsonage also highlights drawing as a system of representation and 
raises the question of what is actually represented in the drawings that Margaret and Henry 
create. The drawings represent their subjects, of course—the cottages and trees and figures that 
are on the paper—but Henry’s, at least, also represents his feelings about Margaret and 
constitutes perhaps the only sign in the novel of which her uptake is more superficial than his. 
Margaret does not look at the drawing as something that speaks to her about Henry’s character or 
feelings. Instead, she looks at it as something to be valued for how well the medium is used and 
not for the deeper meaning that it reveals. Margaret’s departure from her typical selection of 
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meaning to the atypical selection of appearance suggests that there is a willful repression of 
meaning in the scene, as there was with the compliments earlier in the novel. Margaret’s 
embarrassment over being the center of attention triggers a different part of her habitus that leads 
her to repress an aspect of an utterance that could be taken as interest in her. 
 As he does with the compliments, Henry makes Margaret—in a very obvious and 
straightforward way—the object of his scrutiny when he includes her in the drawing. When he 
shows Margaret the drawing, “She laughed and blushed: Mr. Lennox watched her countenance” 
(25). As Jill Matus points out, “Often indicated by blushing and feelings of shame, Margaret’s 
knowledge and awareness of herself as sexually attractive is repeatedly denied even as it is 
simultaneously recognized and commented on by others” (42). Although Matus does not pursue 
this line of inquiry, blushing does constitute an important communicative mechanism throughout 
the novel. Importantly, however, blushing and shame are associated not only with Margaret’s 
awareness of being sexually attractive but with Margaret’s awareness of anyone’s sexuality  and 
particularly with any attention that seems liable to uptake emotional display as sexual interest. 
Margaret’s response to Edith’s behavior illustrates this: “Edith saw Captain Lennox hesitating 
whether to come in. She threw down her music, and rushed out of the room, leaving Margaret 
standing confused and blushing to explain to the astonished guests what vision had shown itself 
to cause Edith's sudden flight” (14). Suddenly the center of attention, Margaret is embarrassed 
and unsure how to explain Edith’s behavior without her words being taken up as evidence of her 
own sexual knowledge. In the drawing scene, Margaret’s blush could be evidence of either her 
own sexual awareness or her embarrassment at Henry’s gaze; Henry is clearly watching 
Margaret’s face to gauge her reaction and use her blush to determine her interest in him. 
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He certainly seems to take it up as an indication of her interest in him because he 
increases the sexual language in the conversation: 
“It was irresistible. You can't know how strong a temptation it was. I hardly 
dare tell you how much I shall like this sketch.” 
He was not quite sure whether she heard this latter sentence before she went 
to the brook to wash her palette. She came back rather flushed, but looking 
perfectly innocent and unconscious. (25)  
Margaret’s response in this scene suggests the connection between the aesthetic and sexual 
objectification of women. As in Margaret’s interaction with Henry at Mrs. Shaw’s, the narrator is 
careful to tell us that Margaret appears “innocent and unconscious” of the sexual nature of his 
words. Nevertheless, her blush indicates that she takes up Henry’s aesthetic gaze in the same 
way that she takes up sexual interest (as cause for embarrassment), suggesting that for a young 
woman of marriageable age there is little difference between being admired aesthetically and 
being desired sexually. Of course, since we’re reading this scene largely through Henry’s 
perspective it is possible that Henry misreads her expression. However, since he has a vested 
interest in taking up her emotional display as sexually interested, and he seems to be otherwise 
good at seeing what he wants to see, it seems unlikely. Her surprise at his proposal also suggests 
that she did not take the comment sexually or that she was able to repress the potentially sexual 
nature of his comments and behavior.  
 Something about the medium of drawing seems to have made it safer for Henry to 
express his emotions sincerely because the novel makes it clear that he is not generally as sincere 
in language, or at least that his emotions are not often strong enough to demand expression in 
language. Despite the deliberateness of his expression in drawing, he makes the comment above 
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accidentally: “He was glad of it, for the speech had slipped from him unawares—a rare thing in 
the case of a man who premeditated his actions so much as Henry Lennox” (25). His usual 
premeditation suggests that he is aware of the potential effects of his utterances and often speaks 
purposefully to elicit a response rather than speaking sincerely what he thinks or feels. Although 
this premeditation is not linked to sexuality, in the way that consciousness is, it is shown to be 
potentially more damaging as it prevents meaningful dialogue and relationships.  
 Margaret’s relationship with John Thornton emphasizes the importance of sincerity. 
Because John cares more about the truth than he does about offending her or her father, Margaret 
is able to openly dispute with him about appropriate standards of behavior and she is able to 
convince him to rethink his relationship with his workers. Valerie Wainwright argues that 
“through vital and often vehement interaction John Thornton and Margaret Hale eventually 
achieve what Gaskell perceives is of fundamental importance to the good life: both are capable 
of the kind of rigorous reflection that contributes to a crucial refashioning of their individuality” 
(87). I would argue, however, that neither conflict nor individualism are central to Gaskell’s 
view of the good life. Ultimately, it is not the conflict that either Margaret or John take away 
from their encounters but the knowledge that sincerity in expression is necessary if we are to 
learn how to appropriately take up the words and actions of those whose value systems are 
different from our own. Dorice Elliott notes that in his speech to Mr. Colthurst, John espouses 
the view that “[b]ecoming familiar with others…teaches one to read the sign systems of their 
dress, demeanor, gestures, and speech; correctly reading these signs leads to understanding and 
understanding leads to affection” (Elliott 151). Margaret is eventually able to convince John that 
this cooperative model of labor relations is better than an antagonistic one because his sincerity 
of expression allows her to understand his values, opinions, and character. The interactions that 
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create their better understanding of one another convince them both, as they are meant to 
convince the reader, that attention must be paid to signification and uptake in order to construct a 
more fair and functional society.  
 Margaret and Thornton’s relationship is not the only one that operates primarily on the 
valuing of sincerity over effect. In their relationship, sincerity is necessary for learning to engage 
with others in a way that can make society more healthful and productive. In Thornton’s 
relationship with his mother, sincerity is shown to be the only way of knowing another person at 
all. The narrator observes that  
A stranger, a careless observer might have considered that Mrs. Thornton's 
manner to her children betokened far more love to Fanny than to John. But such a 
one would have been deeply mistaken. The very daringness with which mother 
and son spoke out unpalatable truths, the one to the other, showed a reliance on 
the firm centre of each other's souls, which the uneasy tenderness of Mrs. 
Thornton's manner to her daughter…betrayed the want of a secure resting-place 
for her affection. (87) 
The narrator places the same emphasis on contextualized uptakes in this passage that the text 
places on them in Margaret and John’s relationship. Mrs. Thornton’s behavior could easily be 
taken up in unintended and deeply mistaken ways by a stranger—someone who does not know 
what her and her son’s systems of signification are—or a careless observer—someone who does 
not take the time to try to figure them out. However, the concern over sincerity in this passage is 
more than a question of correcting socially-constricted uptakes; it is a question about an 
individual’s fundamental ability to know another human being. What this passage reveals is a 
deep-seated anxiety about identity when communication is pragmatic rather than sincere. 
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Ultimately, we can know another person only through their communicative acts and that 
knowledge becomes deeply suspect if the main purpose of communication is to anticipate and 
secure certain uptakes. Systems of representation, even as they make possible the kind of 
behavior that anticipates uptakes, must also allow for the kind of emotive and sometimes daring 
sincerity that can reveal the center of the soul and ensure honest and meaningful 
interrelationship. 
Representation & Scripts 
 Prescribed systems of representation also raise the question of symbols within a system 
that always mean or accomplish the same thing in a given situation, what I will refer to as scripts. 
Despite the novel’s vilification of premeditated behavior, it also reveals the necessity of social 
scripts and conventions in showing people how to communicate with and relate to one another. 
Gaskell demonstrates some of the problems that arise from not having social scripts in Henry’s 
proposal scene—despite her seeming insistence that true intentions and a pure heart will 
communicate themselves to others, almost magically and despite any potential problems that 
genre, medium, or social convention may pose. Henry, who is usually so fluent, has trouble 
finding the right words to use, and the scene is full of stops and starts as they both struggle to use 
wordings that will not hurt or offend the other even as they know that their meanings will. 
Proposals, as highly private events that exist at the edge of a polite society that prefers to ignore 
sexual attraction, do not have easy scripts that allow their participants to accomplish their 
purposes with relative ease.  
 Henry does not even have to say anything for Margaret to sense that they are about to 
pass the bounds of comfortable and familiar conversation:  
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she wished herself…anywhere away from him, for she was sure he was going to 
say something to which she should not know what to reply. In another moment 
the strong pride that was in her came to conquer her sudden agitation, which she 
hoped he had not perceived. Of course she could answer, and answer the right 
thing; and it was poor and despicable of her to shrink from hearing any speech, as 
if she had not power to put an end to it with her high maidenly dignity (28) 
Margaret’s agitation over her own agitation suggests that unanticipated subjects, particularly in 
conversations in which the response is high-stakes, can cause emotional disturbance strong 
enough to be visible—that is, that the experience of emotion in these situations can lead 
automatically to its display. Conversely, the scene also suggests that strong emotion can preempt 
speech and make reply difficult. In part, then, Margaret’s inability to reply could be because she 
has not figured out her feelings about Henry, since she has so consistently repressed them. 
Primarily, however, her problem seems to stem from the absence of a script that could help her 
to craft a response consistent both with her emotions and her narrative identity.  
Gaskell illustrates the usefulness of social scripts in allowing people to assess their 
surroundings and their relationship with others: “[Mrs. Thornton] made all these reflections as 
she was talking in her stately way to Mrs. Hale, and uttering all the stereotyped commonplaces 
that most people can find to say with their senses blindfolded” (89). Mrs. Thornton’s use of 
social scripts allows her to observe the Hales’ home and occupations, make assessments about 
their character, and decide how she would like to conduct her acquaintance with them, all 
without sacrificing her social propriety. There is, however, no stereotyped commonplace that 
will work for Margaret in her predicament, either as a satisfactory reply or as a stalling tactic that 
can give her enough time to recover emotionally and formulate an honest and tactful response. 
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Henry’s proposal threatens the narrative identity of purity and daughterly devotion that she 
embraces, and she must reassure herself of her ability to respond to his potentially dissonant 
advances with the silence consistent with her maidenly dignity. 
 As in other situations in which Margaret doesn’t know what to say—or knows that 
anything that she says or does will be taken up in ways contrary to her intentions—she relies on 
the use of silence to retain her agency. Margaret seems to want a romantic relationship, and 
really all of her relationships, to be built upon respect for her as a person, primarily her intellect 
and morals. It is perhaps this emphasis on intellect that leads her to assume that she has ultimate 
control over her body and emotions and to act as if her body and emotions are somehow separate 
from her as a person. The novel’s repetitive comments on her appearance and dress highlight 
how difficult it is for her to have people see beyond her looks. The repeated incorrect uptakes of 
her displays also emphasize how difficult it is for her to get people to take her expressions as 
sincere rather than conscious displays. She seems to respond to this difficulty in part by trying to 
neutralize her own body’s experiences and displays, and the book comments frequently on 
Margaret’s ability to be both silent and completely still. On the one hand, her silence is 
picturesque in inviting views of her as an aesthetic object, “some great Egyptian statue” (251). 
On the other, it confounds other character’s readings of her by refusing to present them with any 
kind of display to interpret. The neutralization of her body is in this sense a social presentation 
that attempts to convey her purity and intellect to others, or at least to refuse to give them any 
emotional information that they can take up in ways contrary to her own sense of narrative 
identity. This is not entirely successful, as many of the other characters still describe her as 
haughty, an adjective she expressly denounces (86). Still, there is something commanding and 
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indescribable about her presence that allows her to use her silence to gain control of hostile 
situations and that convinces onlookers of the purity and dignity she values so highly in herself.  
 Margaret is certainly not in control of the proposal scene, despite her assurance that her 
dignity will allow her to be. Henry gets the better of her from the beginning by “taking her by 
surprise, and getting sudden possession of her hand, so that she was forced to stand still and 
listen, despising herself for the fluttering at her heart all the time” (28). In part, it seems that 
Margaret is concerned that her emotion, her fluttering heart, will display itself physically and be 
read by Henry as an acquiescence regardless of the verbal response she gives him. This concern 
is shown to be legitimate by his behavior at the end of the chapter when he takes “her sad and 
pensive face” as a sign that he is “not so indifferent to her as she believes” and decides not to 
give up hope (30). Because Margaret has relatively little social power, and because of the 
restrictive nature of polite conversation, there is very little that Margaret can do if he persists in 
this belief. She cannot negotiate with Henry, as she attempted to do in her description of 
Helstone, to correct this misunderstanding. Because romantic and sexual interest had to remain 
largely unspoken—remember the extreme interest in blushing and other nonverbal cues—the 
disparity between intention and uptake becomes more pronounced and the stakes of such 
miscues become higher. Margaret is largely at the mercy of his perceptions, mistaken though 
they may be, and his repeated misreadings of her displays highlight her inability even to 
determine the meaning of her own emotions.  
 Her lack of control is also evident in the fact that Henry can force her to stop and listen to 
him. Throughout the book, she is subject to the force of other people’s wishes as one of John’s 
observations accidentally makes clear. When he is at the Hales’ for tea, John notes that when 
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She handed him his cup of tea with the proud air of an unwilling slave…he almost 
longed to ask her to do for him what he saw her compelled to do for her father, 
who took her little finger and thumb in his masculine hand, and made them serve 
as sugar-tongs. Mr. Thornton saw her beautiful eyes lifted to her father, full of 
light, half-laughter and half-love, as this bit of pantomime went on between the 
two, unobserved, as they fancied, by any. (74) 
Although Margaret’s love for her father seems to make her willing and happy to perform this 
service, the language of force in this passage remains problematic. The equation between a 
woman’s position and slavery, while overly dramatic, emphasizes Margaret’s aversion to being 
the object of masculine attention and being required by her social position to submit to someone 
else’s opinions of how she ought to feel or behave. Margaret’s choice is paramount here—her 
agency, that is her feelings about and desire to perform her duties, makes the difference for her 
between obligation and care. This seems particularly relevant in the context of Henry’s proposal. 
Unless Margaret is able to marry a man who will treat her as an equal, her duties as a wife and 
mother will be forced and burdensome, rather than performed willingly and happily. Henry’s 
misreadings and his force in the proposal scene reveal that he is most certainly not that man.  
Margaret’s response makes it clear that she has recognized the vulnerability that this 
development in their relationship could cause for her: “Pray, let us both forget that all this' 
('disagreeable,' she was going to say, but stopped short) 'conversation has taken place” (29). She 
equates forgetting the conversation with erasing the emotion. If Margaret does not have to 
respond and they can both forget that the utterance ever happened, then the reality of their 
relationship is not altered. This suggests that expression, not meaning or emotion, dictates the 
nature of relationships. By erasing the aberrant expression, they can return to a social script that 
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is both more familiar and more comfortable—and one in which Margaret can retain the narrative 
identity of purity and daughterly devotion she embraces. In this light, Margaret’s consistent 
repression of Henry’s sexual interest makes a good deal of sense. By avoiding any hint of it, 
Margaret is attempting to protect herself from having to bear the (false) responsibility for his 
feelings—which his anger at her rejection seems to suggest is a reasonable precaution—and is 
making selections that are consistent with her narrative identity. Henry’s reaction to this 
comment rejects the assumption that expression is more important than emotion, an odd 
sentiment from someone who consistently selects appearance over meaning, and emphasizes his 
own hypocrisy in demanding that Margaret validate his emotions when he has consistently 
refused to try to understand hers. Although Margaret’s selection serves to protect her sense of 
identity, it poses a potential threat to his. 
Henry selects the social view of his eligibility as a suitor, not Margaret’s response, to 
uptake Margaret’s rejection: “A struggling barrister to think of matrimony!” (29). Although the 
novel makes it clear that Margaret would not be able to explain why she could not love Henry, 
he does not bother to ask. This is, in part at least, probably a defense mechanism. By displacing 
the personal onto the social, Henry is able to protect himself from the emotional pain of her 
rejection. His selection also serves as a direct invocation of the narrative identity he embraces, 
that of the well-bred professional who can raise his social position through his wit, talent, and 
hard work (and perhaps an advantageous marriage). By selecting in this way, Henry is using a 
potentially humiliating and painful experience to reify his own narrative identity. Rather than 
Margaret’s rejection being a threat to his sense of self, this uptake makes her rejection a 
confirmation of it. Although Margaret rejects him because he is too superficial, the effect of her 
rejection is ultimately to reinforce his superficial identity and habitus. Normally circumspect and 
52 
 
anticipatory, Henry has been emotive and impulsive throughout his time at Helstone. The 
rejection that accompanies this new expressive behavior leads him to move quickly and 
vehemently back to “worldly” (30) ways of talking, ways that do not rely on emotion but use 
social convention to form utterances instead. In short, her rejection marks the failure of his non-
habitual behavior and encourages him to return to his appearance-based habitus. 
 This selection also denies Margaret’s agency by suggesting that society—or at the very 
least, social expectations—rather than Margaret, made the decision against him. It is 
unsurprising then, that Margaret is so annoyed by his speech that she will not answer him (29). 
Margaret uses her silence as a mechanism for reclaiming that agency and refusing to validate any 
uptake that erases her ability and right to make decisions as a rational human being. She also 
uses her silence as a censuring mechanism, as a refusal to engage with a habitual selection that 
she views as deeply flawed:   
How different men were to women! Here was she disturbed and unhappy, because 
her instinct had made anything but a refusal impossible; while he, not many 
minutes after he had met with a rejection of what ought to have been the deepest, 
holiest proposal of his life, could speak as if briefs, success, and all its superficial 
consequences of a good house, clever and agreeable society, were the sole 
avowed objects of his desires. Oh dear! how she could have loved him if he had 
but been different, with a difference which she felt, on reflection, to be one that 
went low—deep down. Then she took it into her head that, after all, his lightness 
might be but assumed, to cover a bitterness of disappointment which would have 
been stamped on her own heart if she had loved and been rejected. (31)  
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In this explicit consideration of their responses to the conversation, Margaret emphasizes the 
differences between their habitus that make them ultimately incompatible. Concerned with 
appearance and social class, Henry responds to his disappointment by subordinating his emotion 
to superficial social goals. Concerned with meaning and emotion, Margaret responds to her own 
emotional turmoil by trying to understand the motivations of the person who has caused it. Her 
review of multiple and potentially conflicting interpretations of his behavior emphasizes how 
important it is to her to select for motivation and character in taking up others’ words and 
actions.  
Conclusion 
Because my readings up to this point have been very localized, I want to conclude by 
considering a more comprehensive reading of the novel that is made possible by such close 
attention to uptake. When I first read North and South, I was frustrated by Margaret’s consistent 
repression of her own and other characters’ emotions, as well as her stubborn insistence that she 
ultimately had the correct interpretation of other characters’ behavior, even when she clearly did 
not. However, the ways that systems of representation and social scripts influence the possibility 
for both sincere display and the uptake of display as sincere in the novel reveal the complex 
relationship the novel creates between repression, identity, and agency. Although Margaret’s 
repression is restrictive and occasionally damaging, it also gives her agency in a novel where she 
has almost no control over what happens to her or what the uptakes of her behavior are. 
Repression protects Margaret from experiencing emotions that would be damaging to one of the 
few positive narrative identities available to her socially. By suppressing her emotional 
experiences, it also prevents them from escaping as displays that could be misread in ways 
dangerous to her. And, finally, her repression thwarts others’ potentially oppressive or 
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threatening utterances by taking them up in less-threatening ways, thereby giving her a measure 
of control over other people’s meanings. Margaret’s relative powerlessness makes the subtle 
power dynamics of communication central to her ability to navigate her world. Although 
repression and sincerity still stand in tension with one another, the novel ultimately endorses 
Margaret’s deep investment in sincerity and cooperative relationship as necessary for personal 
fulfillment and social progress in a world that runs on socially-conditioned uptakes.  
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